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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of the trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS) agreement on social welfare, when the effects on public health are 
taken into account. In particular, we study how the new international patent policy 
affects social welfare through the availability of pharmaceutical products. Extending 
the model developed by Grossman and Lai (Am Econ Rev 94(5):1635–1653, 2004) 
on optimal patent protection, this paper examines the externality generated by the 
intellectual property rights enforcement on our definition of public health.
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1 Introduction
International policies to protect intellectual property rights (IPRs) have seen impor-
tant changes during the past two decades. Rules on patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
and other forms of IPRs have become a standard component of international trade 
agreements. In 1994 during the Uruguay Round, developed countries made the 
upgrading of IPRs protection one of their highest priorities, setting up the agree-
ment on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs). The TRIPs 
agreement calls on countries to enforce a minimum standard of protection lasting 
20 years for several categories of intellectual property, ensuring the same treatment 
in all subject matters without considering the peculiarities of each good, including 
pharmaceuticals.
Historically, the issue of intellectual property rights is considered a contentious 
one. The primary reason for providing patent protection is to permit inventors to 
earn returns on their inventions, and therefore to provide an incentive for technology 
to advance. In the absence of some form of protection, private agents will have weak 
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reasons to invest their resources in generating new information and technologies. 
On the other hand, though spurring the production of a greater variety of goods, this 
institution enhances the firms monopolistic power and so it leads to an inefficiently 
low level of output.
A fundamental tension exists between the social desirability of widespread dis-
semination of available knowledge and the need for society to provide adequate 
rewards to suppliers of new inventions (e.g. see Chin and Grossman 1990; Dear-
dorff 1992). On top of that, another important aspect of this issue lies in the pos-
sible adverse welfare effects that would be caused by extending intellectual patent 
protection indiscriminately to all goods across the world. Beyond the common wis-
dom according to which IPRs are an important factor to foster economic growth, 
an opposite view is argued equally vehemently (Mansfield 1985; Diwan and Rodrik 
1991; Deardorff 1992; Maskus and Penubarti 1995). The main point of contention is 
the claim made by governments of many poor developing economies that unquali-
fied patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices 
for medicines, with adverse consequences for the health and well-being of their citi-
zens, and not only. Hence, welfare implications that derive from a strict enforcement 
of IPRs are complex. The simple fact that trade flows rise or fall in response to an 
enforcement of the law on IPRs is not sufficient to draw conclusions regarding eco-
nomic welfare. Both static and dynamic effects need to be considered (Deardorff 
1992; Helpman 1993).
The aim of this paper is to study how the new international patent system affects 
social welfare by changing the availability of pharmaceutical products.1 The exten-
sion of patent protection to pharmaceuticals yields an externality in terms of deterio-
ration of health, both in developed and developing countries. In actual facts, the high 
integration of travel and transport has caused an acceleration in the transnational 
spread of viruses, and the control of infectious diseases has become more difficult.2 
In other words, communicable diseases which traditionally are linked to poverty, 
could become common also in the developed world. The recent facts about the dif-
fusion of communicable diseases, due for example to social contagion across social 
networks (see Schwamm 2018), have showed us how developed countries are vul-
nerable to “neglected diseases”. Policies dealing with infective diseases are of great 
importance nowadays. Yet, only recently economists have begun to look at these 
questions in a formal way (Gersovitz and Hammer 2004). In the light of the above 
observations, our aim in the current paper is to rethink the role of patent protection 
in the pharmaceutical sector, studying the welfare implications according to differ-
ent levels of public health.
With this purpose we extend the set-up developed by Grossman and Lai (2004) 
by including explicitly the health sector. The main assumption is that agents derive 
1 Intellectual property rights include a large range of legal tools apt to protect inventions; literary and 
artistic works; and symbols, names and images used in commerce (i.e. copyrights, industrial design, pat-
ents, trademarks, etc.) In the current work we focus our analysis on the optimal patent policy, and we will 
use IPR(s) exclusively to refer to patent(s).
2 About the global dimension of non-communicable diseases see Murray and Lopez (1996).
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utility from individual consumption of pharmaceutical goods, while at the same 
time their utility is increasing in the level of the national health. Individual utility 
depends on the individual health, and this in turn is influenced by personal con-
sumption of drugs and benefits positively from the presence of a healthy environ-
ment. At the same time, it is by increasing their personal utility level that individuals 
contribute to an enhancement of the social health. Focusing on one of the legal tool 
adopted to protect IPR, we investigate how it is possible to define the optimal patent 
system in a world where individuals consume “good health” in the terminology of 
Grossman (1972, 2000). In the current paper, we define health differently from the 
classical approach.3 According to the Grossman’s seminal work (1972), we assume 
that health is a good desired to enhance well-being and so utility, and vice versa 
through individual utility the health increases. Consumer’s utility is affected by indi-
vidual pharmaceutical purchases, which in turn contribute to an improvement of the 
social welfare. In other words, a sort of positive externality is at work. Being in good 
health not only contributes to the wellbeing of a single individual, but it benefits 
also people that are surrounded by healthy subjects, from family members to col-
leagues at work. If everybody takes care of her own health, each individual contrib-
utes directly to an improvement of the social health, creating positive effects which 
are beneficial to everyone. On the contrary, being in poor health conditions triggers 
a set of costs which can be directly matched to the single individual affected by the 
problem (e.g. inability to go to work), and indirectly link to the affected subject (e.g. 
crowded hospitals/GPs). For example, in the very recent times we are witness of the 
diffusion of new waves of pandemic diseases which are causing important social 
costs.4
In the current analysis we assume that individuals do not internalize this social 
externality when maximizing their utility. In other words, consumers ignore the 
existence of a positive externality which reduces the risks of diffusion of infectious 
diseases.5 Since the patent policy affects the monopolistic prices, the choice of the 
optimal patent life must weigh its relation with possible externalities. In order to 
determine the optimal patent policy, we have to balance two opposite effects that 
influence the level of social welfare, re-examining the trade-off between static costs 
and dynamic benefits that was first studied by Nordhaus (1969).6 First of all, we 
3 Throughout the classical literature, health is described as a durable capital stock that produces an out-
put of healthy time. According to the classical approach health represents both a form of human capital 
(Mushkin 1962; Becker 1964; Fuchs 1966; Cropper 1977; Clerico 1984; Howitt 2004), and a productive 
asset. In this last case healthier workers are physically and mentally more energetic and robust, so they 
are less likely to miss work due to illness, either of themselves or their families.
4 Vaccination campaigns have been always considered one of the most important public policies to pro-
tect and improve health. Lately, lack of trust towards this important form of intervention has exposed 
entire populations in the developed world to new waves of diseases which were considered as hav-
ing been eradicated, e.g. see the case of the measles outbreak in New York State: https ://www.nytim 
es.com/2019/04/29/healt h/measl es-outbr eak-cdc.html?modul e=inlin e.
5 Since they are not considering this externality, consumers are available to pay for each medicine a 
lower price than the optimal one.
6 In our analysis governments choose an optimal patent policy by endogenizing the health externality. 
Alternatively, by relying on a system of subsidies which aims to promote the consumption of more medi-
cines, governments could fix the health externality problem directly. To this end a change in the taxation 
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know that patent protection yields a positive effect, because a longer-lasting patent 
life increases the number of inventions (Nordhaus 1969; Grossman and Helpman 
1991). More precisely, this benefit is present if we can identify an equilibrium where 
a larger supply of inputs are combined to produce a larger amount of patented goods. 
On the other hand, we cannot disregard the detrimental effects in terms of welfare 
from a static point of view. A longer patent length implies a longer monopolistic 
power, with all the ensuing inefficiencies associated with monopoly.
In a closed economy, where the extent of the health externality is connected with 
the consumption level of pharmaceutical goods, the identification of the optimal pat-
ent protection is crucial for the social welfare, and the optimal patent length turns 
out to be increasing in the health externality.7 The approach adopted in this paper 
is based on the concept of international surveillance of communicable diseases as a 
global public good, necessary to preserve global health (Kaul et al. 1999).
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop our first analy-
sis of a simple model with ongoing innovation. In Sect. 3 we study the optimal pat-
ent policy in a closed economy. Through a numerical simulation, we measure the 
welfare effects in a country that has no trade with the rest of the world, focusing on 
the health sector. In Sect. 4 we consider a world economy in which there are two 
countries that differ with respect to both the market size, along with the capability 
of conducting research and development, and their health externality. Finally, we 
develop our conclusions in Sect. 5.
2  The basic model
We consider a small closed economy with ongoing innovation protected by IPRs 
where there are two types of agents: consumers and firms. This model generates 
a precise formula that characterizes the trade-off between static costs and dynamic 
benefits of strengthening the patent protection. Our economy has two sectors: sec-
tor one which produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition, and sector 
two which produces a continuum of differentiated products, namely pharmaceuti-
cal drugs under monopolistic competition. Following Grossman and Lai (2004) 
(henceforth G&L) we assume that the realization of differentiated products is the 
result of private investments in R&D. To guarantee adequate returns from invest-
ments in research, in this economy the innovator-producer enjoys the exclusive right 
to produce and supply its own IPR-protected good. It follows that the welfare cost 
Footnote 6 (continued)
system would be needed. Given the social costs generated by a taxation system (i.e. consumers price, 
market competition, pass-through, etc.), we remain agnostic on this regard, and instead we focus on the 
protection of intellectual property right policies promoted by governments.
7 Assuming a full enforcement of the patent protection laws, we believe in the benefit that derives from 
an international agreement that protects the patent right. But, we consider that the life of each patent 
must be analyzed according to the peculiarities of each good. We deem that the utility deriving from a 
good such as a packed orange drink is different from the utility coming from another kind of good, such 
as the malaria vaccine.
435
1 3
Journal of Industrial and Business Economics (2019) 46:431–457 
of providing patent protection stems from the fact that the patent-holder is allowed 
to exercise its full market power for the new product, letting the monopolist pre-
vent other agents from accessing the new products (deadweight loss). However, to 
achieve a desirable balance between incentives to inventors and benefits for consum-
ers, patent protection is granted for only a limited period of time. In our model, we 
assume that the patent length cannot be larger than the normal time for a products to 
became obsolete, that is the finite economic life length of an invented good defined 
by 휏.8 It should be noted that 휏 also represents the period of time during which con-
sumers gain utility from the patented good, before it will become obsolete.
2.1  Demand side
In our economy, preferences of a representative consumer are characterized by
where c is the utility coming from the consumption of the homogeneous good, and 
휐 is the utility a consumer enjoys from both the individual and social health level, H 
and H respectively. The subutility 휐 has the following Cobb–Douglas form:
with 0 < 𝛼 < 1.9 In our specific framework, H represents the utility deriving from 
the consumption of drugs, whereas H represents the utility that a representative indi-
vidual derives from the state of the social health, measured by good health. Equation 
(2) incorporates an important externality into the health subutility function, whose 
magnitude is captured by (1 − 훼) . More specifically, through the consumption of 
pharmaceutical drugs an individuals satisfy not only their own needs, but they exert 
a relevant influence on the level of public health. This externality identifies the ben-
efits that the representative consumer receives from living in a healthy environment. 
Hence, we define H as the sum of the subutilities gained from the consumption of 
each pharmaceutical drug. Precisely, H is the total utility obtained by consuming a 
bundle of pharmaceutical products available in the economy, defined as:
where h is the generic utility function for each different drugs, x(i, t) represents the 
consumption of the ith variety of differentiated pharmaceutical product at time t, 
n(t) is the number of differentiated pharmaceutical products invented before t which 
still have a value for consumers at time t. By assumption h(x) is increasing and 
strictly concave, i.e. h� (x) > 0 and h�� (x) < 0 , and to ensure a positive demand for 
(1)U(c, 휐) = c + 휐(H,H),
(2)휐(H,H) = H훼H1−훼 ,
(3)H = ∫
n(t)
0
h[x(i, t)]di,
8 According to the TRIPs agreement, currently a patent lasts for 20 years. During the Uruguay Round it 
has been claimed to be the lapse of time before a new good is defined obsolete.
9 Note that 휕휐
휕H
= 훼H훼−1H1−훼 . However, since ex post H = H , it follows that 휕휐
휕H
= 훼..
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each variety at any finite price, we assume h� (0) = ∞.10 Although the decision to 
purchase a pharmaceutical good may involve different categories of people, and the 
decision-making process varies from country to country, to simplify the analysis in 
the current paper we omit these aspects.11 More precisely, we adopt the standard 
economic theory assuming that the decision to purchase a good (including pharma-
ceuticals), to make the payment, and then to consume it is undertaken individually 
by the single person. Moreover, following G&L, in the current analysis we make the 
simplifying assumption that the demand for differentiated products does not vary 
with respect to income. Thus, a rich country does not have a larger market for such a 
type of goods than a poor country. Individuals love spending money to buy different 
medicines because via their consumption they can increase their own health’s level. 
The consumer budget constraint is defined as
where c is the consumed quantity of the homogeneous good, whose price is set 
equal to 1 since we treat it as the numéraire, and p(i, t) is the price of a single drug at 
time t.12 The consumer’s objective is to maximize her utility by purchasing all varie-
ties that are not yet obsolete.13 Hence, her maximization problem is defined by the 
objective function (1) subject to constraint (4), given (2) and (3). We assume that the 
representative consumer behaves as follows: initially, she chooses a bundle of goods 
according to her first-order condition
after which, she devotes her remaining expenditure to buy the homogeneous good. 
Clearly, from the equilibrium condition in (5) it emerges that the consumer demand 
of pharmaceutical products is increasing in 훼.
2.2  Production side
We assume that in sector one firms determine the level of production of the homo-
geneous good by maximizing their profits under certainty. In sector two all firms 
are innovators and, following Nordhaus (1969), the output produced by a firm is 
a function of the amount of inventive inputs. More precisely, each firm devotes a 
(4)w(t) = c + ∫
n(t)
0
p(i, t)x(i, t)di.
(5)훼h�[x(i, t)] = p(i, t) ∀i = 0..∞ and ∀t = 0..∞,
10 Additionally, imposing the condition −xh
��
(x)
h� (x)
< 1 for all x, we ensure that every firm charges a finite 
price for its own differentiated product.
11 For instance, doctors, pharmacists and insurers, having different weights all contribute to the drug 
choice. For more details about this complex process, see Fink (2000).
12 If we adopt the common view of treating health as capital (Grossman 1972), in our case we have that 
the stock of health is subject to a total depreciation every year. It follows that Ht+1 − Ht = It − 훿Ht , and 
where 훿 = 1 and then Ht+1 = It.
13 We are ignoring the fact that individuals could be interested in buying obsolete goods. For example, 
some therapies, considered obsolete in the developed world, could still represent a vital medical care in 
some developing countries.
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certain quantity of labour in R&D to increase technological knowledge, along with a 
constant stock of unskilled workers. Thus, the production of the differentiated good 
is described by the following CES function
where, following G&L, 휙(t) represents the flow of new inventions at time t, while 
LH and LR14 are the constant unskilled workforce and the variable amount of labour 
devoted to R&D respectively, and 훽 ≤ 1∕2.15 Finally, a measures the production 
coefficient, which corresponds also to the level of technology employed in the pro-
duction process. Moreover, a units of labour is the same amount of input needed 
to produce 1 units of homogeneous good. Perfect competition in the market of the 
homogenous good leads to the typical equilibrium condition for the wage level, 
where w = 1∕a . Perfect labour mobility ensures a unique wage rate. In the competi-
tive market for the homogeneous good, the equilibrium is described by
We assume that all goods invented at time t become obsolete at time t + 휏 . Then, 
it follows that the rate of innovation in our economy is given by:
which depends on the growth of the number of inventions happened after a specific 
time lag. Recalling the actual patent extent, the rate of innovation is equal to the dif-
ference in the flow of new products after 20 years.16
In order to simplify the notation, hereafter we omit the time subscript and we 
assume that the flow of new invention, 휙 , does not change over time, and in the 
stationary equilibrium the rate of innovation is constant. Following the hypothesis 
that all investments in innovation are sunk so that new knowledge is available at 
zero marginal cost (Nordhaus 1969), we assume that research programs chosen by 
innovators are able to yield immediate results. Hence, it follows that every firm uses 
a new technology for 휏 years. In our economy innovation is the result of private 
investments for which the inventor is the exclusive owner of its own advancements 
(see among others Nordhaus 1969; Grossman and Helpman 1991). As in G&L, the 
labour force employed in manufacturing the differentiated goods is just the amount 
(6)휙(t) = F[LH , LR(t)] = {b[LR(t)∕a]훽 + (1 − b)L훽H}
1∕훽 ,
(7)pc = aw = 1.
(8)ṅ(t) = 𝜙(t + 𝜏) − 𝜙(t),
14 Notice that LH + LR = L . Following the Schumpeterian–Nordhaus approach, the spending E is always 
positive in equilibrium, and the aggregate equilibrium is described by the usual equality between invest-
ment and saving, Y − E = S . Since national income is define as Y = rLH + wL + nmM휋 , after some sub-
stitutions, we obtain that the aggregate expenditure in equilibrium is E = w
(
L − LR
)
+ nmM휋 , where nm 
represents the number of firms which hold a patent.
15 This assumption corresponds to the hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution between the two 
inputs is ≤ 2 . As it is clearly explained in G&L, this assumption is sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure 
that any patent policy that satisfies the FOC for an interior point, satisfies also the SOC.
16 In line with this assumption, we are assuming that the speed of innovation is given by the amount 
of labour applied in the R&D sector. Then, if the flow of new products is ṅ , the total human capital 
employed in R&D is equal to aṅ (see Grossman and Helpman 1991).
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needed to satisfy the demand at the equilibrium price. Then, the equilibrium of the 
firm in sector two is described by
where 휂 represents the value of the new patent, which corresponds to:
where 휋 defines the monopolist profit, M describes the number of consumers (size 
of the market), 휌 is the constant discount rate, and 휔 ∈ [0, 1] measures the strength 
of the government policies enforcement. It is important to note that governments 
who aim to protect the patent holder right introduce a set of policies which define 
both the time-length of IPR and the breath of its enforcement. Hence, the value of 
the new patent depends on both 휏 and 휔 , and it is given by the discounted expected 
flow of profits until the patent expires ( t < t + 𝜏 ). From Eqs. (9) and (10) it emerges 
clearly that a rise in either patent length or patent enforcement increases the value 
of a new patent. Following the Nordhaus’s approach, for which in equilibrium each 
patent holder firm behaves as a monopolist, we have that in equilibrium all monopo-
listic firms equate their marginal revenues with their marginal cost
where w is the constant wage rate, (1 − 1∕휖) is the markup and 휖 corresponds to the 
demand elasticity.17 The consumer equilibrium for the differentiated good is defined 
by 훼h�(x) = pm . This expression helps us to find out how the level of 훼 influences the 
equilibrium price and the demand for a differentiated good. After a simple differen-
tiation,18 we obtain:
It follows that the greater is 훼 (or the lower is the level of the health externality, 
1 − 훼 ), the higher is the demand level for a pharmaceutical good, since individu-
als always prefer to increase their utility from increasing the consumption of drugs. 
From the total differentiation of Eq. (5) we can see that, if 훼 does not vary, we have a 
negative relationship between demand and price for pharmaceuticals
(9)휂FL
(
LH , LR
)
= w,
(10)휂 =
휔M휋(훼)
휌
(1 − e−휌휏),
(11)wa = p
(
1 −
1
휖
)
,
(12)dx
d𝛼
= −
h�(x)
𝛼h��(x)
> 0.
𝛼h��(x)dx = dp→
dx
dp
=
1
𝛼h��(x)
< 0.
17 The monopolist profit is defined as 휋 = px − p(1 − 1
휖
)x . Clearly, from the marginal revenues we are 
able to see that the monopolist will always choose an output level such that the elasticity of demand is 
𝜖 > 1..
18 Differentiating 훼h�(x) = pm we get dp = h�(x)d훼 + 훼h��(x)dx. Assuming a price constant over time, we 
can derive the relationship between 훼 and x by a simple manipulation.
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Hence, we end up with a demand function that is decreasing both in price and in the 
externality. Using Eq. (12) we easily obtain the expression for the elasticity of the 
demand with respect to 훼 as follows
To sum up, if a country has a low level of externality and is hit by a pandemic, 
its citizens tend to purchase more pharmaceuticals with a greater impact on prices. 
Therefore, where the production of pharmaceutical goods is in the hand of monopo-
listic firms, the price level increases more with an ensuing deterioration of social 
welfare.
3  The optimal patent policy in a closed economy
In this section we study the government’s maximization problem. Following G&L, 
we refer to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as a vector of polices 
(휏,휔) , which captures both the time-length of the patent and the stringency of its 
enforcement policies. Governments choose a package of policies, which includes 
also other instruments, such as limits on patentability, compulsory licensing require-
ments, copyright and trademark protections, and so on. The parameter 휔 ∈ [0, 1] 
identifies the probability that a non-expired patent is made compulsory by the gov-
ernment, at any moment in time. Alternatively, 휔 is also the fraction of the country’s 
territory in which the patent is enforced. The parameter 휏 represents the patent dura-
tion recognized by the policy maker, within the economy. Obviously, the govern-
ment assigns to patent holders the exclusive right to produce and sell the protected 
good in the local market. The present discounted value of a stream of income of one 
dollar, from time t = 0 to 휏 , is given by
From this expression, we see that the optimal level of research is decreasing in 
휌 , the constant discount rate. If the discounted value of the flow of revenues in the 
interval from t = 0 to t = 휏 rises, the volume of research activities that is profitable 
to perform improves. Moreover, research efforts increase with the life of the pat-
ent.19 From above, we define the patent policy in place in our economy as follows
Hence, we can rewrite the value of a new patent, previously defined in equation 
(10), as follows:
𝜖𝛼 =
dx
d𝛼
𝛼
x
= −
h�(x(𝛼))
h��(x(𝛼))x
> 0.
(13)T ≡ (1 − e−휌휏)∕휌.
(14)Ω = 휔T .
(15)휂 = ΩM휋(훼).
19 More specifically, dT∕d𝜏 = e−𝜌𝜏∕𝜌 > 0 , whereas the effect of the interest rate is negative, 
dT∕d휌 = −
[
휏 exp(−휌휏) − T
]
∕휌.
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In our analysis we refer to Ω as the instrument through which we capture the 
whole set of incentives that the government provides for the realization of new 
inventions, and at the same time, it also measures the strength of the IPR protection 
available in our economy. The new optimal patent policy will be set by the policy 
maker in order to maximize his objective function, which is the social welfare. We 
solve the government’s maximization problem to determine the optimal length of 
intellectual property rights with the aim to minimize the deadweight loss deriving 
from the patent system. Before proceeding, it is useful to specify some aspects. As 
a measure of the social welfare we use the net surplus of the economy, which com-
prises the consumers surplus and the producers surplus minus resource costs. At any 
time, the consumer enjoys a surplus of Cm from the consumption of goods whose 
patent is enforced and a surplus of Cc from the consumption of differentiated prod-
ucts which are sold at a competitive price, either because the patent has expired or 
because production is not protected (homogeneous good). Hence, the two levels of 
surplus are defined as
The two quantities xm and xc represent the amount of goods purchased by the 
representative consumer from a monopolistic and competitive supplier, respectively. 
Since our aim is to investigate the externality effects that involve both types of con-
sumer surplus, we proceed according to the following steps. First of all, we differen-
tiate the monopolistic consumer surplus defined in Eq. (16) as
Recalling the equilibrium price previously defined as pm = 훼h�(xm(훼)) , the above 
expression can be rewritten as
where dx∕d𝛼 = −h�(x)∕𝛼h��(x) > 0 . We observe that the monopolistic consumer 
surplus is decreasing in the magnitude of the externality ( 1 − 훼 ), as the social mar-
ginal utility is larger than the individual marginal utility.20 To study the externality 
effects on the competitive consumer surplus, we adopt the same type of analysis. 
Then, taking the derivative of Eq. (17) with respect to 훼 , it results that the competi-
tive consumer surplus is decreasing in 1 − 훼 as well21
(16)Cm = h
(
xm(훼)
)
− pmxm(훼),
(17)Cc = h
(
xc(훼)
)
− pcxc(훼).
dCm
d훼
= h�
dxm
d훼
− pm
dxm
d훼
= (h� − pm)
dxm
d훼
.
(18)
dCm
d훼
= (1 − 훼)h�
dx
d훼
,
(19)
dCc
d𝛼
= h�
dx
d𝛼
− p
dx
d𝛼
= (h� − p)
dx
d𝛼
= (1 − 𝛼)h�
dx
d𝛼
> 0.
20 Recall that h′ represents the social marginal utility from the consumption of health.
21 That said, we need to distinguish goods invented before and after t = 0 , because the production real-
ized before t = 0 yields some exogenous surplus that is affected by the new patent regime.
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Considering both consumer surplus types, its total is equal to:
where T = (1 − e−휌휏)∕휌 . From above we have that the total discounted surplus is 
given by the sum of the surplus from the consumption of the monopolistic good 
and of the surplus from the consumption of the good bought at a competitive price. 
Recalling Eqs. (1),(3), and E = w
(
L − LR
)
+ nmM휋 , and assuming that the new 
goods are introduced in the market at a constant rate ( 휙 ) after time 0, the govern-
ment’s maximization problem can be defined as
where Λ0 is the discounted present value of the consumer surplus along with the 
profits derived from goods invented before t = 0 . According to our formulation of 
the welfare function, we expect to find a trade-off between the benefits of reduc-
ing the monopolistic inefficiency and the need to stimulate investments in innova-
tion. Our purpose is to pin down the optimal patent policy Ω in the presence of a 
health externality. Correction of this market failure requires a reduction in the patent 
length, whereas innovation incentives for the identification of new drugs call for a 
strengthening of patent protection. Recalling the production function defined in Eq. 
(6), where the equilibrium LR is a function of Ω , and combining Eqs. (9), (10) and 
(14), we obtain the equilibrium monetary wage level
This last equations states that the marginal productivity of human capital invested 
in R&D, expressed in terms of the patent value, is equal to the monetary wage.22
Now we have all the ingredients to determine the optimal patent policy in a 
closed economy. Notice that the aggregate welfare in Eq. (21) depends both on the 
heath externality effect and on the index of patent protection. In this framework 
patent length and enforcement are treated as perfect substitute in defining a IPRs 
regime. After introducing the equilibrium level of LR as function of Ω , the welfare to 
be maximized can be written as:23
from which the first-order condition is
(20)CmΩ + Cc(T − Ω),
(21)
max
Ω
{
W(0) = Λ0 +
w
(
L − LR
)
휌
+
M휙
휌
[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼)]Ω +
M휙
휌
Cc(훼)(T − Ω)
}
,
(22)ΩM휋(훼)FL
(
LH , LR
)
= w.
(23)
휌W(0) =휌Λ0 + w[L − LR(Ω)]
+MF
(
LH , LR(Ω)
)
{[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)]Ω + Cc(훼)T},
(24)
MF
(
LH , LR(Ω)
)
[Cc(훼) − Cm(훼) − 휋(훼)]
= MF�
LR
{[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)]Ω + Cc(훼)T}L
�
R
− wL�
R
.
22 Equation (22) gives us the opportunity to uncover the functional relationship between the labour 
devoted to R&D and the policy variable Ω , by differentiation we get M휋(훼)FLdΩ +M휋(훼)ΩFLLdL = 0. 
From this latter expression we obtain dLR
dΩ
= −
M𝜋FL(LH ,LR)
M𝜋ΩFLL(LH ,LR)
> 0.
23 See the "Appendix" for details.
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This last equation reveals how the effect of an increase in Ω is influenced by the 
magnitude of the externality. A greater patent protection raises the monopoly power 
reducing the output volume, but at the same time, it expands the varieties of availa-
ble goods. What emerges clearly is that the optimal patent policy depends in a com-
plex fashion on the functional forms and on the parameters of the model. The crucial 
aspects of the model, especially the relation between Ω∗ and the health externality, 
can be better highlighted by using a numerical simulation. For this purpose we cali-
brate the model along the lines of the existing literature.
Consistently with Ginarte and Park (1997), we acknowledge that a country’s level 
of development in research activities and the market structure are among the most 
important factor in the definition of the patent protection level. A numerical exercise 
allows us to study how the optimal patent policy changes as we vary the parameters’ 
values, and how the social welfare is affected accordingly. Assuming a market size 
of 100, we initially set the number of skilled and unskilled workers employed in the 
innovative sector two equal to 60% and 40% of the size of our economy, respec-
tively. We define a unitary production coefficient, a = 1 , which corresponds to the 
level of technology employed in the production process of the innovative sector, and 
analogously the number of inputs needed to produce 1 unit of the homogenous good 
in sector one. To reflect how the level of R&D available in the country determines 
the optimal patent policy, the share parameter b assumes alternatively values equal 
to 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8. Enforcement is clearly an important feature of the patent policy, 
and at a first stage we assume that, regardless of the size of the economy the govern-
ment sets alternatively 휔 = 0.1, 0.5, 1 . The annual rate of discount is constant and set 
equal to 휌 = 0.04 . Table 1 reports the calibration of the model under the hypothesis 
that the individual utility function is given by
which, following the consumer’s equilibrium defined in Eq. (5), implies a consumer 
demand equal to x = (훼∕p)1∕휎 , where the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion is described by 𝜎 > 0;𝜎 ≠ 1.
We report in Fig. 1 the relationship between the optimal patent policy, expressed 
by the patent-length under the assumption of a specific enforcement level, and the 
level of health externality, where we vary pivotal parameters of our closed economy, 
i.e. clockwise: consumers size, share parameter of the production function, patent 
protection enforcement policy (probability), and responsiveness of the growth rate 
of consumption.
Figure 1a shows how the optimal patent protection is related to the magnitude 
of the health externality. According to our numerical simulation this relationship 
is positive, which means that the optimal patent length is increasing in the health 
externality, 1 − 훼 . In other words, to maintain a high state of social health, gov-
ernments should guarantee and preserve the exclusivity of patents’ owner right, 
in order to motivate further advancement in new drugs discovery. As expected, 
for different values of consumers size, M, the optimal patent policy changes 
considerably, highlighting the importance of the size of the economy. For any 
h[x(i)] =
x(i)1−휎 − 1
1 − 휎
,
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magnitude of the health externality below 0.67, the best patent policy is decreas-
ing in the size of the country. Indeed, it varies from a minimum level of 1 year to 
the maximum level of 20 years, which has been imposed as a ceiling.
From this analysis it becomes clear how, in a closed economy in which we do 
not take other endogenous effects into account, fixing a priori the duration of the 
patent protection at 20 years is not optimal. Changing the amount of the unskilled 
workers employed in the economy ( LH ), like varying the labour productivity, 
yields no significant difference in terms of optimal patent policy. Conversely, 
a shift in the relative weight of skilled labour with respect to the unskilled one 
in the production function (b) alters the optimal patent length substantially (see 
Fig.  1b). This means that a country’s level of research and development activ-
ity influences the optimal length of patent protection. The larger is the quota of 
skilled workers, the lowest should be the time-patent length. In Fig. 1c, we change 
the level of effort that the government is able to apply on the enforcement of the 
IPRs regime, as measured by the index 휔 . At any given level of 1 − 훼 , the greater 
is the enforcement effort of the government, the lower the optimal patent length. 
Intuitively, in a country where the legal enforcement matters, the optimal time-
length of the patent’s owner exclusive right can be reduced. In other words, when 
innovators can be reassured that any unauthorized agent will not be able to use 
their innovation, the returns on investment in R&D are guaranteed in a shorter 
period of time. The implications of different values of 휎 , which is the inverse of 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are displayed in Fig. 1d. A low level 
of 휎 , that is a high intertemporal elasticity, entails a patent protection extended to 
the maximum, for most levels of the health externality. It follows that goods char-
acterized by a low intertemporal elasticity (e.g. drugs for infectious diseases) call 
for a limited period of IPR protection. This would mean that in front of a health 
emergency, it would be optimal to reduce the time-length of the patent’s owner 
exclusivity so that drugs can be produced on a larger scale without restrictions, 
allowing a broader group of the population to have access.
4  Global patent protection
In this section, by opening up the economy to the rest of the world, we present an 
extension of the previous closed economy model in order to evaluate the magnitude 
of the strategic interaction between two countries which are interlinked between 
them. In particular, in a world characterized by imitation and trade and affected by 
health externalities, we want to study governments’ national incentives to adopt IPR 
policies. It is well established that at an international level a fundamental tension 
exists between the social desiderability of widespread dissemination of available 
knowledge and the need to provide adequate rewards to the suppliers of new inven-
tions. In light of this contention, we investigate how the absence of an international 
agreement on patent protection can affect the global welfare, when this knowledge 
base gives the opportunity to preserve an important global public good: public 
health.
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Table 1  Baseline calibration in 
a closed economy Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution 휎 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.7
Discount rate 휌 = 0.04
Enforcement policy (probability) 휔 = 0.1, 0.5, 1
Amount of unskilled labor L
H
= 40
Consumers size M = 100
Measure of labor productivity a = 1
Share parameter b = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8
Patent duration (years) 휏 = 20
Large economy Medium economy Small economy
 = 1  = 0.5  = 0.1  = 0.7  = 0.5  = 0.2
b = 0.8 b = 0.5 b = 0.2
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
*
*
*
*
1
1 1
1
Fig. 1  Optimal patent policy in a closed economy
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4.1  The IPR system at a global level
Consider a world with two countries: the North and the South (or the East and the 
West) where each country’s public health depends on the country’s own health 
externality. Under the assumption that the innovation process occurs in the North, 
we want to evaluate the influence of the Southern externality on the North’s opti-
mal patent policy, and vice versa. In particular, we first seek to identify the opti-
mal patent policy, under the assumption that the health externality is confined to 
the single countries. Afterwards, we move our analysis towards an investigation 
of the cross effects of the two health externalities. In order to find the equilibrium 
we build a game in which: the two countries (the North and the South) are the 
two players; both countries set their own patent policies simultaneously following 
a non-cooperative strategy. The North and the South differ in some aspects of the 
economy: their wages rate, their market size, their stock of human capital, and in 
particular their health externality. However, in both countries (1) consumers have 
identical preferences; (2) the representative consumer maximizes her intertempo-
ral utility function; which (3) at a certain point on time, for country 휅 is defined 
as
where c휅(t) is the utility enjoyed from consuming the homogeneous good for an indi-
vidual resident in country 휅 at time t. Whereas, like in the previous section, 휐휅 is the 
consumer’s subutility deriving from the individual level of health, H휅 , and the social 
health level H휅 in each country. As in Eq. (2) of the previous section, the consumer 
subutility coming from the health sector take the following Cobb–Douglas form:
Again, we assume that the individual’s utility depends on both the individual per-
sonal consumption of drugs and the social health level. By the health externality 
( 1 − 훼휅 ), we measure the advantage (or disadvantage) for a consumer of living in 
country 휅 . We define H휅 as the total utility obtained by consuming a bundle of phar-
maceutical products available in the 휅 economy
where h(x) is the subutility derived from the consumption of a single pharmaceuti-
cal product; x휅(i, t) represents the consumption of the ith variety of the differenti-
ated pharmaceutical products at time t; nS(t) and nN(t) indicate the number of those 
differentiated pharmaceutical products introduced and manufactured respectively in 
the South and in the North before t, which still have a value for consumers at time 
t. The market size of the two countries is denoted by MN and MS , and by assump-
tion both countries are affected by their own externality, 
(
1 − 훼휅
)
 , with 휅 = S , N. 
After examining the case where both countries have equal market size, we deal with 
the scenario where having a different number of consumers influences government’s 
(25)U휅(t) = c휅(t) + 휐휅(H휅 ,H휅), where 휅 = N, S,
(26)𝜐𝜅(H𝜅 ,H𝜅) = H𝛼𝜅𝜅 H
1−𝛼𝜅
𝜅
, with 0 < 𝛼𝜅 < 1.
(27)H휅 = ∫
nS(t)+nN (t)
0
h[x휅(i, t)]di,
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decisions over the patent policy. Like in the previous section, the production of new 
goods at time t is described in each country by the following CES function
where LH휅 is the human capital endowment of country 휅 employed in the manufac-
turing sector; LR휅 is the labour devoted to R&D sector; 1∕a휅 indicates labour produc-
tivity.24 Now we have all the main elements to describe the IPR regime. What needs 
to be underlined here is that in both countries holds the principle of the “national 
treatment” .25 This entails government of country 휅 to enforce the same degree of 
protection to all inventors of differentiated products, without discriminating accord-
ing to the firms’ nationality. Foreign and domestic firms have equal opportunity in 
applying for patents in any country and all patents are subject to the same enforce-
ment conditions. This approach is justified by the actual harmonization of the patent 
policies at international level, as result of the TRIPs agreement.26
As before, patent protection is measured by Ω휅 = 휔휅T휅,where 휔휅 is the probabil-
ity that a patent is enforced in country 휅 at any moment in time (or the fraction of 
the market in which a patent is enforced), with T휅 = (1 − e−휌휏휅 )∕휌 and 휏휅 represent-
ing the length of a patent granted by country 휅 . Adopting a standard approach, we 
assume that the patent holder has the exclusive right to use an invention for a spe-
cific period of time. During that period the monopolistic firm is allowed to produce 
and sale for the domestic market and to satisfy the foreign demand. At the same 
time, any unauthorized imports of the protected goods is unlawful. In order to study 
the behavior of the two governments in setting their patent policy, we have to solve 
a strategic game in which at t = 0 , the government applies the protection on the 
invented goods guarantying that right until time 휏 . In the meantime, goods invented 
before t = 0 continue to receive the same protection enforced from the time of their 
invention.
4.2  The welfare in an open economy
Like in G&L, in the current analysis the identification of the optimal patent policy 
lies on the Nash equilibrium, which is also subgame perfect in the infinitely repeated 
game. Once the patent policy has been employed, indeed, it is not possible to revoke 
(28)휙휅(t) = F[LH휅 , LR휅 (t)] = {b[LR휅 (t)∕a휅]
훽 + (1 − b)L
훽
H휅
}1∕훽 ,
24 Initially, we assume that aS < aN , which means that labour is uniformly more productive in the North 
than in the South, whereas to study the welfare effects yielded by a global patent policy we impose 
aS = aN in the numerical simulation. Moreover, we assume that the homogeneous good, which is also the 
numéraire, is produced in positive quantities in both countries, in order to guarantee that w휅 = 1∕a휅 . If 
aS < aN , clearly we have that wN∕wS = aN∕aS > 1..
25 According to the WTO, imported goods must have the same treatment as the locally-produced ones, 
at least after they have entered the market. The same rules hold for services trademarks, copyrights and 
patents.
26 As we discussed in the introduction, the TRIPs agreement was the first multilateral trade accord that 
has represented a major turning point in the protection of intellectual property rights at global level 
(Maskus 2000).
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all the patents that have been granted in the past periods. We refer to the patent 
policies of the two countries as ΩN and ΩS . Recalling Eqs. (13) and (14), we assume 
that patent enforcement is given, so that we focus our attention on the patent length, 
휏 . The patent holder earns an expected flow of profits equal to 휋휔NMN from the 
Northern market, and 휋휔SMS from the Southern market. Since we assume that con-
sumers have the same type of preferences in both countries, we observe that the 
profit per consumer achievable in each country by the monopolistic firm is also the 
same.27 Considering the two types of good, the monopolistic and the competitive 
one, the expected surplus that a single consumer enjoys is given by the following 
expression28
According to the TRIPs agreement, we know that after a period of 20 years, pat-
ent protection will expire. Assuming that no international exhaustions are in force, if 
a patent expires in the South, its price becomes competitive only in the local market 
where both Southern and Northern firms sell their own products, while the same 
good is still protected by the patent in the North.
When a patent expires in the South, the price of the good falls from pm to 
pc = wSaS = 1 and the flow of the consumer surplus for that good in the South rises 
to MSCc(훼S) . When the patent expires also in the North, its market can be served 
by competitive firms producing in both locations and the original inventor loses 
her remaining monopoly income. Obviously, as in the South, also in the North the 
price falls to pc = wNaN = 1 , triggering a higher flow of consumer surplus equal to 
MNCc(훼N). After 휏 periods elapse, the good becomes obsolete and the flow of con-
sumer surplus ceases.
4.3  The Nash equilibrium in an open economy
To solve for the Nash equilibrium of our simultaneous-move game, we compute the 
best response function of both countries. Each best response is obtained by maximizing 
the national welfare, and it expresses the degree of patent protection, for a given level of 
enforcement, as a function of the analogous policy in the other country. Under this sce-
nario, the decision taken by each government in their own country conditions not only 
the optimal IPR regime launched domestically, but also the policy introduced by their 
trade partners. It should be highlighted that both the patent policy and the health exter-
nality of the other country affect the domestic welfare of each country. If we analyse 
the North’s maximization problem, given the choice of the Southern government ΩS , 
we can distinguish two different costs from an enhancement of the IPR. An increase of 
(29)Ω휅Cm(훼휅) + (T − Ω휅)Cc(훼휅).
27 This is a simplifying assumption, as we are aware that consumption preferences are unlikely to be the 
same in the South and in the North. Most diseases that afflict less developed countries do not exist in 
developed economies (i.e. neglected diseases).
28 Like in G&L we suppose that consumers preferences are not affected by the productivity gap, so that 
the price of the patented good is independent of where it was invented and where the production was 
realized. The rest of the assumptions are the same as in Sect. 3.
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the patent length affects firstly all goods invented in the past for which the protection 
time is now larger, and so the time during which the economy suffers a deadweight loss 
equal to MN[Cc(훼N) − Cm(훼N) − 휋(훼N)] . Secondly, the same loss involves those goods 
invented in the South but excluding the profits, which belong to inventors located in the 
South. For each of these goods the cost is equal to MN(Cc − Cm) . Let us now define the 
best response functions of the Northern and the Southern governments. The discounted 
welfare function of the North at time t = 0 is defined as follows
Before proceeding to solve the maximization problem, it is useful to identify which 
variables are affected by ΩN . In fact, some variables, such as LRN , depend directly on 
ΩN , whereas some others, as 휙N , do so only indirectly. At this stage it is important to 
highlight our main assumptions. Firstly, we take for granted that the numéraire good is 
produced in positive quantities in both countries, so as to have a wage level in the North 
equal to wN = 1aN . Secondly, the volume of labour employed in the research sector in 
the North is a function of ΩN . Finally, with reference to the production function, new 
goods are invented in each region according to the production function defined in Eq. 
(6), where the first derivative with respect to ΩN amounts to 휙�N
(
ΩN
)
=
FLL
�
RN
aN
. Given 
these considerations, we can rewrite the welfare function at t = 0 as follows
Given our hypothesis of symmetric countries, the reaction function of both players is 
identical, and computed for the North it is defined as:
where 훾 = −F2
L
∕(FFLL) and 휇 = 휙N∕(휙N + 휙S) . Since the optimal patent policy 
depends on the parameters of the model in a complex fashion, it is useful to study 
(30)
WN(0) = ΛN0 +
wN
(
LN − LRN
)
휌
+
MN(휙S + 휙N)
휌
[ΩNCm(훼N) + (T − ΩN)Cc(훼N)]
+
휙N
휌
휋(훼N)
(
MSΩS +MNΩN
)
.
(31)
휌WN(0) = 휌ΛN0 +
1
aN
(
LN − LRN
(
ΩN
))
+MN(휙S + 휙N(ΩN))[ΩNCm(훼N) + (T − ΩN) × Cc(훼N)]
+ 휙N
(
ΩN
)
휋(훼N) ×
(
MSΩS +MNΩN
)
.
(32)
ΩN = −
훾Cc(훼N)T(
Cm(훼N) − Cc(훼N)
)
(훾 − 1) + 휇N휋(훼N)
+
Cc(훼N) − Cm(훼N) − 휇N휋(훼N)(
Cm(훼N) − Cc(훼N)
)
(훾 − 1) + 휇N휋(훼N)
ΩS.
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how the equilibrium depends on the fundamental parameters of the economy by 
examining a numerical simulation. The calibration of the model is carried out using 
the values reported in Table 2. This numerical exercise allows us to describe how 
the welfare of an open economy is affected not only by its own IPRs and the level of 
the domestic health externality, but also by the policy choices of its trading partners. 
By identifying the magnitude of the effects yielded by the introduction of a new IPR 
regime, we aim to study the implications of a global patent regime that covers both 
the North and the South, for the national welfare.
The results of our simulations are depicted in Figs. 2 and 3, where we represent 
the optimal patent policy for the North and the South, in relation to the Southern 
health externality, and the market size of their countries’ trade partners, respec-
tively. More specifically, Fig.  2a shows the optimal patent policy in each country 
for different levels of the Southern externality, when the North does not present 
any externality at all. The optimal patent protection in both countries increases, as 
1 − 훼S gets larger, and as expected the South moves at a greater speed. Moreover, it 
seems that when the health externality is negligible in both countries the best action 
is to almost abandon the IPR law (both curves start at 휏∗ = 3 ). These results do not 
change when we allow for a larger market size in the North than in the South, with 
the curves starting at a slightly higher level. This means that the effects of the health 
externality prevail over those of market size. In order to measure which effect is 
dominant between health externality and market size we also plot the case where 
the market in the North is ten times bigger than that of the South. Also in this case, 
when 
(
1 − 훼N
)
= 0 , the result does not change. Conversely, assuming MS = 500 and 
MN = 50 , we get that the optimal patent length follows an identical path in the two 
countries. Hence, a small Northern economy with no health externality will choose 
the same patent protection as a large Southern economy affected by health external-
ity. This case is depicted in Fig. 2b.
The scenario is somewhat different when there is a positive value of the health 
externality in the North. Figure 2c shows this case. Starting from a level of external-
ity equal to 0.5 in both countries, we notice that 휏∗ increases as 1 − 훼S gets bigger, 
and under this specific scenario it is greater in the South than that in the North, as in 
Fig. 2a. Instead, for lower level of 1 − 훼S the optimal patent protection in the North 
is greater. The result does not change much when the market in the North is bigger 
than that in the South. Assuming identical externality in the two countries, which 
means the level of good health is the same in both markets and equal to 0.5, we now 
study the dynamics of 휏∗
N
 and 휏∗
S
 when MN increases. To do that we set the size of the 
Southern market to be always larger than that in the North, specifically MS = 100 . 
As shown in Fig. 2d, in this case, the optimal patent protection both in the North and 
in the South is decreasing in the size of the Northern market. These results confirm 
what our simple closed economy model has proved before. For limited sizes of MN , 
the optimal patent length for the North can reach 18 years and more whereas, when 
MN approaches the same size of the Southern market, the optimal length remains 
below the 10 years level. In other words, for large economies to keep the same level 
of good health the optimal patent policy should not be too long. This means that the 
exclusive right recognized to the patent’s holder will cease earlier leaving the pro-
duction of drugs free from any formal legal constraints. Hence, the manufacturing of 
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the drugs will occur under a regime of perfect competition, broadening their access 
to a larger quota of the population. We have also studied differences in the labour 
productivity of the two countries, and the results confirm those obtained in the close 
Table 2  Baseline calibration in 
open economy Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution 휎 = 0.3, 0.5, 0.6
Discount rate 휌 = 0.04
Enforcement policy (probability) 휔
N,S = 0.5
Amount of unskilled labor L
H
N,S
= 40
Consumers size M
N,S = 25, 50, 100
Measure of labor productivity a
N,S
= 1
Share parameter b = 0.7
Patent duration (years) 휏 = 20
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Fig. 2  Optimal patent policy in open economy I
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economy scenario: the larger the quota of skilled workers, the lower should be the 
optimal time-patent length. Vice versa, more time is needed when the number of 
skilled workers is limited. These results are robust to differences in the market sizes 
of the two countries, and to inequalities in the dimension of the health externality 
(see Fig. 4 in the "Appendix").
Results are different when the state of social health in both countries is differ-
ent, namely 
(
1 − 훼N
) ≠ (1 − 훼S) . Figure 3a displays the case of (1 − 훼N) = 0 and (
1 − 훼S
)
= 0.5 . Here, the patent length declines faster in the North as MN increases 
and goes below that of the South after MN = 25 . Enlarging the externality gap 
between the two countries, we find that the patent length of the North is always 
smaller, for any market size, whereas when the health externality matters, the South-
ern government applies a strict patent policy (Fig. 3b). Hence, when we take into 
account the role played by the health externality, in the country where the state of 
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Fig. 3  Optimal patent policy in open economy II
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good health is important, governments tend to be cautious, by guaranteing a time-
length on the exclusive IPR longer than the case where the health externality has no 
capacity. If we assume 
(
1 − 훼S
)
= 0 and 
(
1 − 훼N
)
= 0.5 , an opposite path emerges 
between the North and the South (Fig. 3c). For low levels of MN an increasing level 
of patent protection emerges in the South as the market size of the North grows, 
while the opposite happens in the North.
Allowing for a difference in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between 
the two countries, 1∕휎 , we have that the optimal patent length is significantly lower 
in the country where 1∕휎 is small, confirming to a greater extent the results reached 
in the closed economy case. Figure 3d shows a realistic case in which the North, 
whose economy is bigger, is characterized by a high inverse intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution ( 휎N = 0.3 ) and a low health externality ( 1 − 훼N = 0 ), while 
conversely the South features a low inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion ( 휎S = 0.6 ) and social health receives a high weight ( 1 − 훼S = 0.6 ) is given. As 
MS grows, both patent policies require a diminishing length, but this reduction is 
stronger in the South, implying that the lower intertemporal elasticity in the South 
seems to override the effect of the higher externality. In other words, in the presence 
of outbreak diseases, governments should be more lenient on the extent of the exclu-
sive IPR, shortening the length of the patent’s holder monopoly power. It seems that 
when the state of social health is at stake, static efficiency shows a level of greater 
importance compare to dynamic efficiency. Hence, to keep high the degree of good 
health, governments should make the consumption of the current available medi-
cines easier.
5  Conclusions
Assessing the role played by the new international patent policy, this paper proposed 
a welfare analysis which reassessed the length and breath of the exclusive right over 
the intellectual property (i.e. patent), taking into account the effects on the health 
sector. To this end, we have extended the set-up developed by Grossman and Lai 
(2004) by including the health sector. We have taken into account the incentives 
that a government has, by introducing the IPRs, when the utility of agents depends 
on the consumption of pharmaceutical goods and on the level of social health in the 
whole economy. We investigated the traditional trade-off where the presence of an 
intellectual property right regime is vital to guarantee the private incentives to invest 
in R&D, but when too stringent a deadweight loss can reduce the level of the social 
health, generating detrimental effects.
This paper has shown that the socially optimal patent protection is strictly cor-
related to the health externality. Specifically, according to our numerical results this 
relation is positive: the optimal patent length is increasing in the magnitude of the 
health externality. We know that an increased patent protection has two opposing 
effects: on the one hand it induces a higher flow of new goods. On the other hand, it 
worsens the deadweight loss coming from the monopoly market yielded by the pres-
ence of IPRs. When the social health has a high weight in the individual’s utility, 
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a longer patent life seems to be the consequence of the fact that positive dynamic 
effects dominate static inefficiencies.
Moreover, we have found that in a closed economy analysis, the size of the mar-
ket plays a relevant role, namely the larger the number of consumers the shorter the 
optimal patent length. Moreover, for goods with a low price elasticity (e.g. drugs for 
infectious diseases) it is optimal to reduce the patent-length. When the size of the 
health externality is connected with the individual consumption of pharmaceutical 
goods, the identification of the optimal patent protection is crucial for social welfare. 
When we move to a global perspective, we discover that the social welfare of each 
country is affected indirectly by the patent policy applied by its trading partner. We 
have also found that, for high levels of health externality in the South and average 
levels in the North, the optimal patent protection in both countries is always below 
the minimum required by the actual intellectual property right law (20 years). These 
results are unaffected by the size of the Northern economy. Indeed, this outcome 
is confirmed when the Northern economy is bigger than or equal to the Southern 
economy. Our results confirmed the contention that IPR policy has significant impli-
cations on the global welfare level.
It is important to mention that the market for technology has increased substan-
tially in recent years. In our current analysis we do not include these aspects, remain-
ing agnostic on the role played by licensing and IP agreements, which recently have 
turned to be a valid and widely adopted tool among competitors. Moreover, as for 
patents, also announcements of new discoveries can increase the value of the firm 
and hence the returns to innovation. When deciding the optimal patent policy, gov-
ernments should take into account also these important aspects. However, to sim-
plify our analysis we focused only on the optimal patent policy which captures 
directly both the time-length and breadth of the IPR protection, and indirectly these 
other new development of the IPR world. An interesting line of research would be 
to incorporate these other aspects into the analysis, calling for further investigations.
To sum up, what should be highlighted from our analysis is that, when deciding 
on the optimal patent policy, governments have to take into account the role played 
by the externalities in social health. In a world with almost no barriers, the policies 
adopted by their trading partners would generate effects also at the domestic level. 
Specifically, the presence of the health externality, which is not internalized by the 
single optimizing individual, calls for the monitoring of pharmaceutical consump-
tion and of collective health by the public authorities.
Finally, it should be recalled that the policy recommendations suggested by our 
study are relevant for a highly globalized market, such as the pharmaceutical one. 
Moreover, given the nature of our framework, it is important to mention that where 
the national health system is publicly funded, governments, as primary customers 
of pharmaceutical goods, play an important role. Indeed, not only they can decide 
the optimal patent policy to apply for such products, but they also have the power 
to improve the state of social health by introducing ad hoc regulation on pharma-
ceutical products which expands their access. Further research to incorporate the 
interrelations between patent policy and pharmaceutical price regulation would be 
worthwhile.
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Appendix
Recalling the government maximization problem in a closed economy as per Eq. (21), 
after some manipulations we obtain the government’s objective function:
from which we obtain the first-order condition by imposing 휕W
휕Ω
= 0:
The above expression (A2) can be reformulated in terms of equality between mar-
ginal benefits and marginal costs as follows:
(A1)
W(0) = Λ0 +
w
(
L − LR
)
휌
+
M휙
휌
[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼)]Ω +
M휙
휌
Cc(훼)(T − Ω),
휌W(0) = 휌Λ0 + w[L − LR(Ω)] +M휙[Cm(훼)Ω + 휋(훼)Ω] +M휙[Cc(훼)T − Cc(훼)Ω],
휌W(0) = 휌Λ0 + w[L − LR(Ω)] +M휙{[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)]Ω + Cc(훼)T},
(A2)
− wL�
R
+MF�
LR
L�
R
{[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)]Ω + Cc(훼)T}
+MF
(
LH , LR(Ω)
)
[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)] = 0,
MF�
LR
L�
R
+ {[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)]Ω + Cc(훼)T} − wL
�
R
= MF
(
LH , LR(Ω)
)
[Cc(훼) − 휋(훼) − Cm(훼)],
{MF�
LR
[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)]Ω + Cc(훼)T}L
�
R
− wL�
R
= MF
(
LH , LR(Ω)
)
[Cc(훼) − 휋(훼) − Cm(훼)].
(A3)
MF
(
LH , LR(Ω)
)
[Cc(훼) − 휋(훼) − Cm(훼)]
= −wL�
R
+MF�
LR
L�
R
Ω[Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)] +MF
�
LR
L�
R
Cc(훼)T ,
= MF�
LR
[L�
R
Ω
(
Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)
)
+ L�
R
Cc(훼)T] − wL
�
R
,
= MF�
LR
L�
R
[Ω
(
Cm(훼) + 휋(훼) − Cc(훼)
)
+ Cc(훼)T] − wL
�
R
,
= MF�
LR
L�
R
[CmΩ + Cc(T − Ω)] + L
�
R
(MF�
LR
Ω휋 − w).
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Since 휂F�
LR
= w that is MF�
LR
Ω휋 = w , the above condition becomes:
F
(
Cc − Cm − 휋
)
= F�
LR
L�
R
[CmΩ + Cc(T − Ω)].
Fig. 4  Optimal patent policy in open economy—different labour productivity
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Thus, we have:
since dF∕d휂 = 훾(F∕휂),  and 휂 = ΩM휋 from which d휂∕dΩ = M휋 , hence
where 훾 = −(F�
LR
)2∕FF��
LR
 that is the ratio of the labour elasticity of output to the 
elasticity of marginal product of LR (Fig. 4).
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